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MINERAL ROYALTIES: HISTORICAL USES
AND JUSTIFICATIONS
Jayni Foley Hein∗ and Caroline Cecot**
Governments and private landowners have collected royalties on
mineral resources for centuries. When comprehensive measures to
account for the environmental externalities of mineral extraction are
politically or practically unavailable, federal and state governments may
consider adjusting royalty rates as an expedient way to account for these
externalities and benefit society. One key policy question that has not
received attention, however, is whether a royalty rate can and should be
manipulated in this way, assuming statutory discretion to do so. This
article fills that gap by evaluating the argument for increasing federal or
state fossil fuel royalty rates through historical, theoretical, and practical
lenses. To that end, this article in turn considers the meaning of royalties,
the economic justifications for royalties, the legislative history of the
implementation of federal royalties, and the considerations that private
landowners have relied upon in setting royalties. This article concludes
that it would be appropriate for governments to adjust mineral royalty
rates to account for negative externalities not otherwise addressed by
regulation or to otherwise promote public welfare. Such use of royalties
is consistent with the historical record. Royalties have been used as
pragmatic policy tools from almost their inception, and federal and state
governments have often exercised their existing statutory discretion to
adjust mineral royalty rates to promote public welfare.
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INTRODUCTION

Royalty revenue from coal, oil, and natural gas production on
federal and state lands is an important source of U.S. federal and state
government funds. The federal government currently collects about
$6.23 billion in annual payments from federal leases and shares
approximately half of these proceeds with the states in which mineral
production occurs.1 States also collect royalties from mineral resource
production on their own lands and use the revenue to fund public
education, infrastructure projects, environmental projects, and other
useful government spending.2 Thus, setting the appropriate royalty rate
can have significant implications for public welfare.
Increasingly, scholars and advocates argue that federal royalty
rates are set too low, depriving the public of a larger share of revenue
that is rightfully theirs by failing to account for the negative
externalities of fossil fuel production borne by the public.3 Fossil fuel
production results in emissions of greenhouse gases and other air
pollutants, as well as water pollution, habitat disruption, and other
environmental harms. These scholars and advocates argue that federal
royalty rates should reflect these societal costs, and devote
considerable efforts to calculating the optimal royalty rate to serve

1. 30 U.S.C. § 191(a)–(b); see also U.S. OFFICE OF NAT. RES., Interior Department
Disburses $6.23 Billion in FY 2016 Energy Revenues: Federal Revenues Support State, Tribal,
National Needs (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.onrr.gov/pdfdocs/20161125a.pdf. One exception is
Alaska, which is entitled to 90 percent of federal royalties for onshore oil, gas, and coal production
in the state. 30 U.S.C. § 191(a).
2. See David Woodgerd & Bernard F. McCarthy, State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas
Royalty Rates, 3 PUB. LAND L. REV. 119, 130 (1982) (stating that the state of Montana collects
royalties from mineral resources to promote public welfare); Headwaters Economics, THE
IMPACT OF FEDERAL COAL ROYALTY REFORM ON PRICES, PRODUCTION, AND STATE
REVENUE 5, 17 (May 2015), https://headwaterseconomics.org/wp-content/uploads/Report-CoalRoyalty-Reform-Impacts.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Jayni Foley Hein, Priorities for Federal Coal Reform, Inst. for Policy Integrity,
NYU
School
of
Law
(June
2016),
http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/
Priorities_for_Coal_Reform.pdf (analyzing the federal coal program); Jayni Foley Hein & Peter
Howard, Illuminating the Hidden Costs of Coal, Inst. for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law
(Dec. 2015), http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Hidden_Costs_of_Coal.pdf (illustrating
that externalities of coal have not been included the federal royalties); Spencer Reeder & James
H. Stock, Federal Coal Leasing Reform Options: Effects on CO2 Emissions and Energy Markets:
Executive Summary, VULCAN PHILANTHROPIES 4 (Feb. 2016), http://www.vulcan.com/
MediaLibraries/Vulcan/Documents/FedCoalLeaseModelResults_ExecutiveSummary_Vulcan_F
INAL_16Feb2016.pdf; Tom Sanzillo, The Great Giveaway: An Analysis of the Costly Failure of
Federal Coal Leasing in the Powder River Basin, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS
(2012) (estimating that the federal government lost $28.9 billion in revenues over thirty years due
to Interior’s failure to receive fair market value for coal mined in the Powder River Basin, which
produces 43 percent of the nation’s coal).
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various goals, including accounting for externalities4 and ensuring that
a “fair market value” is returned to the government.5
In the final years of the Obama administration, the Department of
Interior (“Interior”) took notice of several outdated components of the
federal coal program. On January 15, 2016, Interior announced that it
would launch a comprehensive review to identify and evaluate
potential reforms to the program. This review would analyze issues that
include “how to account for the environmental and public health
impacts of federal coal production; and how to ensure American
taxpayers are earning a fair return for the use of their public
resources.”6 Interior released its Scoping Report in January 2017 and
committed to further analyzing potential royalty rate increases for
federal coal that would account for some of the externality costs of coal
production.7
On March 28, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order
directing the Secretary of the Interior to end the coal review,8 and
Secretary Ryan Zinke promptly followed suit.9 President Trump has
repeatedly stated that he would like to bring back coal by eliminating
regulations on the industry, many of which reduce externalities
associated with generating electricity from coal.10 However, President
4. See Hein & Howard, Illuminating the Hidden Costs of Coal, supra note 3.
5. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE ECONOMICS OF COAL LEASING
FEDERAL LANDS: ENSURING A FAIR RETURN TO TAXPAYERS (2016),
ON
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160622_cea_coal_leasing.p
df%22%22 [hereinafter “CEA Coal Report”].
6. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, Secretary Jewell
Launches Comprehensive Review of Federal Coal Program (Jan. 15, 2016),
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-jewell-launches-comprehensive-review-federal-coalprogram.
7. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM: PROGRAMMATIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT - SCOPING REPORT VOL. I, ES-1 (2017),
https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/nepa/65353/95059/114965/
CoalPEIS_RptsScoping_Vol1_508.pdf.
8. See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, PRESIDENTIAL
EXECUTIVE ORDER ON PROMOTING ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (Mar.
28, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/presidential-executive-orderpromoting-energy-independence-and-economi-1 (“The Secretary of the Interior shall take all
steps necessary and appropriate to amend or withdraw Secretary’s Order 3338 dated January 15,
2016 (Discretionary Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) to Modernize the
Federal Coal Program), and to lift any and all moratoria on Federal land coal leasing activities
related to Order 3338.”).
9. See Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order 3348 (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/03/30/document_gw_01.pdf (revokes the secretaries’ order
3338).
10. On March 28, 2017, President Trump, surrounded by energy-industry executives and coal
miners, signed an Executive Order designed to back away from Obama-era climate regulations,
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Trump claims to value getting a good deal, and numerous studies show
that increasing federal coal royalties can earn more revenue for
taxpayers.11 As such, increasing a production-based tax in the form of
a higher royalty rate may be an attractive way for his administration to
account for externalities without regulation, or to achieve other
legitimate policy goals, such as earning more revenue for taxpayers. In
fact, Secretary Zinke established a federal “Royalty Policy
Committee” comprised of representatives of states, energy companies,
and tribes, which is tasked with ensuring that “the public receives the
full value of the natural resources produced from Federal lands.”12 It
remains to be seen what proposals the committee will put forward.
Many states may also be interested in using royalty rate reform to
meet state revenue or other policy goals. Independent studies show
that increasing federal royalty rates can provide net revenue increases
to both the states in which mineral production occurs and the federal
government.13 This additional revenue can be directed back to the
resource-producing states and communities in which production
occurs. Some states may also be interested in royalty rate reform for
environmental purposes such as greenhouse gas emission reduction
goals, especially as the Trump administration moves away from federal
climate change regulation.14
Despite statutory discretion to alter royalty rates, as well as
momentum during the Obama administration to reevaluate and
potentially increase them, one policy question that has not received
including the Clean Power Plan. Trump said, “You know what this says? You’re going back to
work.” Coral Davenport & Alissa J. Rubin, Trump Signs Executive Order Unwinding Obama
Climate Policies, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/climate/trumpexecutive-order-climate-change.html; see also Donald Trump’s Contract with the American
Voter,
https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-Contractv02.pdf
(“FIFTH, I will lift the restrictions on the production of $50 trillion dollars’ worth of jobproducing American energy reserves, including shale, oil, natural gas and clean coal.”).
11. See, e.g., CEA Coal Report, supra note 5 (analysis of the federal coal leasing program);
Hein & Howard, Illuminating the Hidden Costs of Coal, supra note 3; Reeder & Stock, Federal
Coal Leasing Reform Options, supra note 3;
12. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ROYALTY POLICY COMMITTEE CHARTER (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/2017_signed_charter_royalty_policy_committee_
03_29_17.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Mark Haggerty, An Assessment of U.S. Federal Coal Royalties: Current Royalty
Structure, Effective Royalty Rates, and Reform Options, 8 HEADWATERS ECON. (2015),
http://headwaterseconomics.org/wphw/wp-content/uploads/Report-Coal-Royalty-Valuation.pdf
(Demonstrating potential royalty rate increases within the context of coal production).
14. See Brad Plummer, Donald Trump is Preparing to Make Massive Policy Changes at the
EPA, VOX (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/1/23/14356652/
trump-epa-regulations (“Trump’s team will move to tackle many of the existing environmental
rules and regulations put in place under Obama”).
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attention in the literature is whether there is some theoretical basis or
historical precedent for modifying royalty rates to meet public policy
goals. This article fills that gap, evaluating the argument for increasing
federal or state fossil fuel royalty rates through historical, theoretical,
and practical lenses. To that end, this article in turn considers the
historical meaning of royalties, the economic justifications for
royalties, the legislative history of the implementation of federal
royalties, and considerations that private landowners have relied upon
in setting royalties. While royalties typically have a revenue or profitsharing component, a common thread in our research that may be
especially relevant to federal and state governments is that royalties
have historically been used as policy levers to help set national, state,
or private priorities for land, resources, or property use. For example,
the United States government has set royalties at specific rates to
encourage resource production, encourage westward expansion, and
deter socially undesirable behavior. Accordingly, this article concludes
that it would be reasonable for federal and state governments to adjust
mineral royalty rates to account for negative externalities that are not
otherwise addressed by regulation, or to otherwise promote public
welfare.
The article begins with a review of the common law origins of
royalties for mineral resource extraction. Royalties were paid to the
sovereign or to private landowners in order to share the value of the
resource and for the privilege of mining on the property. Next, Part II
describes the economic theories used as justifications for royalties: the
owner’s share of differential returns on mines given their superior
productivity (economic rent); payments to the owner for minerals
removed (user cost); and compensation for negative externalities from
the extraction or use of minerals.
In Part III, the article reviews the legislative history of mineral
resource extraction law and policy in the United States, with a focus on
federal royalties. The federal government has consistently used leasing
policies and royalty rates as policy levers to advance the national
interest and to compensate the public for the removal of mineral
resources. Beginning in the 20th century, legislative history also reveals
growing attention to the relationship between fossil fuel royalty rates
and externalities. This trend has shown itself through state and federal
government revenue sharing arrangements; the Land and Water
Conservation Fund, which directs a portion of oil and gas royalty
revenue to conservation and environmental mitigation; and recent calls
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for hardrock mining royalty reform on the basis of the externalities
associated with such production.
Finally, Part IV of the article briefly examines decisions private
parties make when leasing their land to third parties for mineral
extraction. Like public royalty rates, private royalty rates and mineral
resource leases are influenced by diverse factors, including expected
economic rent, characteristics of the resource, competition for the
lease, and externalities that may affect the leaseholder, such as noise
and pollution. By examining the decisions private parties make to
maximize their self-interest, this Article highlights the factors
government decision makers should consider when acting in society’s
best interest.
Taken together, the historical and economic justifications for
royalties support federal and state governments exercising their
existing statutory discretion to raise mineral resource royalty rates to
account for factors such as negative externalities, including those
resulting from carbon dioxide and methane emissions. Indeed,
exercising this discretion would be an expedient and potentially
lucrative way to align natural resource leasing with greenhouse gas
reduction goals. This remains a politically viable option even as other
mechanisms to address climate change appear infeasible in the current
political environment.
II. THE ORIGIN OF MINERAL ROYALTIES
According to some scholars, English common law origins of the
word “royalty” and concepts of ownership played a role in the
formation of U.S. common law.15 As early as 1400, the term “royalty”
was used by the British Crown to describe any “right or privilege
retained by the crown.”16 It became associated with mineral rights in
particular by 1580, when the British Crown retained title to all land and
the right to take any gold or silver discovered on land conveyed.17 By
1829, the term royalty specifically meant a right retained by a
landowner under a lease in return for the privilege of working a mine.18

15. See Robert E. Sullivan, All About Royalties, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7 (1971),
(“The concepts that minerals are capable of private ownership and that royalty is a payment for
extraction of minerals may be viewed as incorporated into the laws of the United States as a part
of the common law.”).
16. Dante L. Zarlengo, Royalty Concepts and Present Applications to Federal Oil and Gas
and Coal Leases, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1986).
17. Id.; John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 258 (1996).
18. Zarlengo, supra note 16.
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While today a royalty is akin to a type of rent, at common law it
was viewed as the actual portion of minerals due to the crown in return
for the privilege of extraction.19 This concept of a royalty “in kind”
derived from Roman law and Emperor Gratian’s decree establishing
the Empire’s right to all mined gold and silver and one-tenth part of all
other mined minerals.20 Under Roman law, the Roman government
and landowner each received one-tenth of the mined minerals, which
resulted in a total royalty of twenty percent.21 The British Crown
adopted this Roman concept of the right to mined minerals. In addition
to asserting its royal right derived from Roman law, the British Crown
also supported its right to a portion of mined minerals with pragmatic
concerns such as its need for minerals to use in coinage.22
In England, the type of mine defined the recipient of the royalty:
for “royal mines” the royalty was paid to the sovereign, whereas for
other mines it was paid to the landowner for “the privilege of working
the property.”23 As the common law developed, the English monarch
maintained exclusive ownership over all silver and gold discovered,
called the “regalian right.” In contrast, royalties taken on other
minerals functioned as a “rent or tax” or were sold fee simple,
depending on local customs.24 For example, in the tin mines of
Cornwall, the right to work was given to all “free tinners” so long as a
portion of all minerals extracted were transferred back to the owner,
usually about one-fifteenth of the product.25 Mining lead in the mines
of Derbyshire was made contingent on returning one-thirteenth of the
minerals extracted to the crown or the land’s lessee.26
Outside of England, the early concept of a “royal fifth” (quinto
real or quinto del rey in Spanish and Portuguese, respectively) reserved
to the monarch twenty percent of all precious metals and other
commodities extracted by mining, acquired by the monarch’s subjects
as war loot, or found as treasure. The “royal fifth” was instituted in
19. Id.
20. See Katharine K. DuVivier, Sharing the Wealth: Mineral Royalties in Kind, 17A ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11 (1985) (citing W. BAINBRIDGE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MINES AND
MINERALS 106–08 (5th ed. 1900)) (discussing royalties in kind).
21. See Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty Obligations Be Determined
Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically? Part 1, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 547 (1997) (discussing
royalties on marble) (citing CLYDE PHARR, THE THEODOSIAN CODE AND NOVELS AND THE
SIRMONDIAN CONSTITUTIONS, Book X, Title 19, 284 (1952)).
22. See DuVivier, supra note 20.
23. Sullivan, supra note 15 (citing 1 LINDLEY, MINES § 8 (3d ed. 1914)).
24. Id. (citing 1 LINDLEY, MINES §§ 2, 3 (3d ed. 1914); 2 SNYDER ON MINES § 1276 (1902)).
25. LINDLEY, MINE §§ 2, 5 (3d ed. 1914).
26. Id. at § 8.
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Medieval Muslim states, Christian Iberian kingdoms (including Spain
and Portugal), and their overseas colonial empires during the age of
exploration.27 In 1783, King Charles III of Spain dictated the Mining
Ordinances for New Spain whereby a “fifth part” of the value of all
minerals produced from mines located in New Spain (much of presentday Central and South America) was reserved to the crown.28
A similar story unfolded in American colonies. In all land grants,
the British Crown reserved for itself a certain fixed proportion of
minerals discovered in the colonies.29 For example, the Charters of
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and Virginia reserved one-fifth part of all the gold and silver ore as rent
to the British Crown.30 After the American Revolution, the new
United States government sought royalties, too: in 1785, the
Continental Congress reserved one-third part of all gold, silver, lead,
and copper mines.31 According to one historical account, “[i]t was the
force of precedent rather than considerations of public and economic
policy that suggested those provisions of the ordinance reserving a part
of the mineral lands for the use of the government.”32 The U.S.
government later changed course, declaring all mineral lands “free and
open to exploration and occupation, subject to such regulations as may
be prescribed by law.”33
The “regalian” doctrine of ownership of royal metals based on the
crown’s entitlement to these metals, a theory that prevailed in countries
such as England and Spain, was not formally recognized in the United
States.34 Although U.S. mining law has been influenced by mining law

27. The specification of the twenty percent royalty rate on war loot was institutionalized
from the start of the Islamic conquest, with the rate set down in the Quran, in Sura VIII (AlAnfal), verse 41: “And know that out of all the booty that ye may acquire (in war), a fifth share
is assigned to Allah . . . .” (Quran 8:41).
28. CHARLES THOMSON, THE ORDINANCES OF THE MINES OF NEW SPAIN: TRANSLATED
FROM THE ORIGINAL SPANISH, WITH OBSERVATIONS UPON THE MINES AND MINING
ASSOCIATIONS 142, 147 (1825).
29. See LINDLEY, supra note 25, § 31, at 62–63 (describing the crown’s practice of inserting
clauses into land grants that reserve fixed portions of the royal metals that were discovered).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 30, at 61.
32. Id. § 31, at 54.
33. DuVivier, supra note 20; see also LINDLEY, supra note 25, § 55, at 91.
34. See LINDLEY, supra note 25, § 80, at 123 (“A grant or conveyance by the United States
carries all minerals, unless reserved expressly or by implication in the law or instrument
purporting to pass the title.”).
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from other countries, it largely derives from express congressional
legislation, state law, and local rules and customs established in
different regions.35
The rest of this article explores the theoretical and historical
development of natural resource royalties in the United States. In the
next Part, the article describes the economic justifications for natural
resource royalties. These justifications, while often not the explicit
drivers of royalty rates, were influential in defining how stakeholders
contemplated and explained royalty rates.
III. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ROYALTIES
Economists have justified mineral royalty payments as the owner’s
share of differential returns on certain mines given their higher
productivity (economic rent)36 or as payments to the owner for
minerals removed (user cost).37 Increasingly, economists have
considered the relevance of negative externalities from the extraction
or use of minerals in the calculation of socially optimal royalty rates.38
This Part describes this economic literature.
A. Royalty as Economic Rent
The concept of economic rent has been used as a justification for
royalty payments.39 Economic rent (also referred to as the Ricardian
rent) is a payment to the owner of a factor of production that exceeds
the amount necessary to keep the factor in its current employment.40
David Ricardo first explored the idea of an agricultural land rent equal
to the advantage of using a tract of land in its most productive use
35. Id. § 81, at 124.
36. See, e.g., Larry L. Dale, The Pace of Mineral Depletion in the United States, 60(3) LAND
ECON. 255, 263 (1984) (explaining how the market usually reflects the fair price of these
resources); John H. Mutti & William E. Morgan, Changing Energy Prices and Economic Rents.
The Case of Western Coal, 59 LAND ECON. 163, 164–65 (1983) (explaining that royalty payments
can represents the “diminution in the value of the mine”); John E. Orchard, The Rent of Mineral
Lands, 36(2) Q.J. ECON. 290, 290 –91 (1922) (describing the disagreement among academics over
how to explain royalty payments); ROSS GARNAUT & ANTHONY CLUNIES ROSS, TAXATION OF
MINERAL RENTS 1, 17–36 (Clarendon Press Oxford 1983) (providing an overview of taxation and
policy issues related to mineral rent).
37. See, e.g., Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36; Orchard, supra note 36; GARNAUT & CLUNIES
ROSS, supra note 36.
38. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 36; Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36; Orchard, supra note 36;
GARNAUT & CLUNIES ROSS, supra note 36.
39. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 36; Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36; Orchard, supra note 36;
GARNAUT & CLUNIES ROSS, supra note 36.
40. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(London 1817), http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP1a.html (Chapter 2).
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relative to the advantage of using the marginal tract (or the best rentfree tract) for the same purpose.41 In other words, land rent is the
payment to the owners of especially fertile land in return for the
production advantage (or cost savings) associated with using that land.
Just as agricultural land varies in its fertility, mineral mines vary in
their production costs due to deposit quality and proximity to markets.
For this reason, some mines may earn economic rent. For example, a
coal mine on land with superior coal deposits (say, thicker deposit
seams located closer to the surface) will be able to produce coal at
lower cost than will a mine on land with inferior coal deposits (such as
narrow deposit seams located at great depth).42 Similarly, a mine
located near an industrial or shipping center will have lower production
costs than a mine located farther away and subject to higher
transportation charges.43 The owners of superior mines earning
economic rent will be able to charge higher royalties. These royalties
tend to be seen as fair, enabling the mineral owner to share in the
economic rent arising from the mineral’s superior quality.44 Moreover,
unlike other forms of taxation, royalties imposed on economic rent
would not, in principle, distort behavior.45 Of course, if the private costs
of production do not fully account for the social costs of production
and no corrective policy measures are taken, then the resulting level of
production would not be socially optimal. In such a case, even if
royalties capture more than the economic rent and thereby reduce
production, the “distortion” in behavior would actually result in a
production level closer to the socially optimal level.46
There is evidence that U.S. royalties have historically been
directed, at least in part, at capturing economic rents.47 John Orchard,
41. Id.
42. See Orchard, supra note 36, at 298. (“The extrinsic powers include transportation and
market; the intrinsic, thickness of seam, depth, angle of seam, faulting, nature of roof, and the
like.”).
43. Id., at 298–99.
44. See GARNAUT & CLUNIES ROSS, supra note 36, at 21–22.
45. Even assuming that there are no externalities and that the royalty perfectly captures
economic rent, it is possible that, in the long run, the royalty will distort behavior because by
cutting into the economic rent, it will reduce incentives for discovering high-quality mineral
deposits.
46. CEA COAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 11–12.
47. Whether a royalty actually captures economic rent is a separate matter. Such a royalty
would be specific to each site, based on ex ante predictions of economic rent given the site’s
attributes and associated production costs, which may itself diverge from ex post realized costs.
See Radford Schantz, Jr., Purpose and Effects of a Royalty on Public Land Minerals, 20(1)
RESOURCES POLICY 35, 37 (1994) (analyzes the royalties for minerals on public land). Generally
speaking, a federal royalty could not perfectly capture such rent. See, e.g., P.S. DASGUPTA & G.M
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in his analysis of the history of mineral rents, argued that in the United
States, royalties were “partly compensation for the mineral removed
and partly surplus or economic rent arising through superiority of some
mines over others.”48 He quoted the secretary of the American
Institute of Mining Engineers explaining U.S. royalty rates in 1889 as
follows: “With us the royalty always settles itself according to special
advantages. The lowest royalty is the royalty that must be paid, or else
the landowner would not care to let the mine be worked. On top of
that, you have all those higher royalties coming in to represent special
natural advantages.”49 He also quoted a Birmingham mining engineer
as stating in 1919 that “strictly speaking, royalties are partly rent or
income, and partly capitalization of assets.”50
Orchard also examined early royalty rates and found that they
tended to be higher when economic rents were likely to be higher—
that is, when the costs of extraction were low due to the coal’s
“accessibility, quantity, thickness, depth, value, and other conditions
that affect the cost of its extraction.”51 For example, Kentucky in 1910
had a royalty of 8 cents per ton on coal from 3- to 4-feet-thick seams,
10 cents on coal from 4- to 5-feet-thick seams, and 12 cents on coal from
5- to 6-feet-thick seams.52 Orchard also noted that the U.S. Geological
Survey, in its 1910 classification and valuation of government coal
lands, placed a significantly higher value on lands less than 15 miles
from a completed railroad.53 According to Orchard, these U.S.
practices were consistent with practices in European countries at the
time.54
HEAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES 362 (1980) (“The subject is
particularly murky, since the structure of optimum taxes often depends sensitively on the
constraints the government faces in wielding the various controls available to it.”); JAMES OTTO
ET AL., MINING ROYALTIES: A GLOBAL STUDY OF THEIR IMPACT ON INVESTORS,
GOVERNMENT, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 30, 94 (World Bank 2006).
48. Orchard, supra note 36, at 307–08. Notably, Orchard and the American mining operators
that he quotes also refer to user costs, a concept discussed infra in the next Section, as partly
justifying the royalty rate.
49. Id. at 296 (quoting Rossiter W. Raymond, an American mining engineer, then secretary
of the American Institute of Mining Engineers, in his testimony before the British Royal
Commission on Mining Royalties appointed in 1889).
50. Id. (quoting T. H. Bailey, a Birmingham mining engineer, testifying before a 1919 British
coal commission).
51. Id. at 298.
52. Id. at 299–300.
53. Id. at 299.
54. Id. at 302–03. Most illustrative is the French practice in 1890 of setting variable royalty
rates that ranged from 1/6th of yield for coal mined from the shallowest and thickest seams to
1/80th of the yield for coal mined from the deepest and thinnest seams. See id.
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The concern about the “special advantages” of certain mines was
also evident in the testimony before Congress prior to the adoption of
the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976. The concern
apparently motivated the lower royalty rate on coal produced from
underground mines, which were thought to be more costly to operate.
Legislative history is discussed more thoroughly in the next Part.
The discussion of economic rent typically does not involve
discussion of externalities. But, if environmental regulation is
otherwise adopted, a “special advantage” of a mine might include its
low environmental externalities. Such a mine would earn economic
rent that the public, in turn, could capture through the royalty rate.
Mines that generate high environmental externalities might earn no
economic rent or become unprofitable to operate at all. In such a case,
the mineral owner may prefer for the mineral to stay undeveloped, a
concept discussed in the next Section.
B. Royalty as User Cost (or Compensation for Liquidated
Wealth)
Unlike the agricultural land on which Ricardo based his theory of
economic rent, coal is a nonrenewable resource. Its supply is exhausted
in the long run, at which point economic rent becomes zero. Because
of the unique characteristics of nonrenewable resources, some
economists have distinguished between royalties on nonrenewable
resources and rents, influenced by the work of Harold Hotelling.55 In
1931, partly in response to the conservation movement, Hotelling
developed a model of the optimal rate of extraction of a nonrenewable
resource over time.56 According to Hotelling, profit-maximizing
competitive firms will extract a mineral resource until the market price
of the resource equals the production costs of the last unit plus a cost
equal to the net present value of the forgone future profits had the
resource remained in the ground (in other words, the cost of not being
55. This issue has attracted significant debate in economics. Some economists argue that
royalties for nonrenewable resources are not rents, see, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS Book V, Chapter X, 254, (Macmillan & Co., 8th ed. 1920) (stating that “[a]
royalty is not a rent, though often so called.”), while others argue that the concept of rent is
relevant, see e.g., Lewis Cecil Gray, Rent Under the Assumption of Exhaustibility, 28(3) Q.J.
ECON. 466, 467–70 (1914) (arguing that “the present value of the surplus income from the
mine . . . is the present value of the total rent in which it will yield”). Still others conclude that
royalties include both economic rent and user cost. See Orchard, supra note 36, at 290–97; see also
Ben Fine, Landed Property and the Distinction between Royalty and Rent, 58(3) LAND ECON. 338,
343–45 (1982) (arguing that the question itself is irrelevant from a general equilibrium context).
56. Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39(2) J. POLITICAL
ECONOMY 137–75 (1931).
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able to use the resource in the future). This latter cost is now referred
to as the Hotelling rent or user cost.
Economist Alfred Marshall explained that, conceptually, a royalty
is akin to the user cost because it compensates the owner of the mineral
for the reduced opportunity to produce the mineral in the future.57 A
tax on the user cost, unlike a tax on economic rent, would distort firm
behavior because it would incentivize a firm to leave mineral resources
in the ground for the future.58 Hotelling’s model implies that the
optimal royalty schedule must induce the mining firm to exhaust the
mine in such a way that marginal net benefits grow over time at the
rate of discount.59
Under this framework, the government would be justified in
collecting a high royalty if the stock of the mineral were limited even if
there were no economic rents.60 On the flip side, if the stock of the
mineral were large relative to anticipated demand, the royalty would
be lower.61 Arguing in favor of this aspect of a royalty, Orchard
explains that the owner of a currently unprofitable coal deposit, one
that does not earn economic rent, would not allow any mining without
compensation, as he would “gain[ ] nothing” and “lose[ ] an asset that
may bring in an income for himself or his heirs with a change in market
conditions.”62 The owner would demand payment equal to the
marginal or minimum royalty necessary to compensate the owner for
his loss even in the absence of economic rent.63
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, there is little evidence that
user costs were a significant component of historical royalty rates for
coal in the United States. This is largely because the supply of coal has
not been perceived to be scarce, implying user costs close to zero,64

57. MARSHALL, supra note 55.
58. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 36.
59. See Hotelling, supra note 56, at 165–69; Gerard Gaudet et al., Optimal Resource Royalties
with Unknown and Temporally Independent Extraction Cost Structures, 36(3) INT’L ECON. REV.
715, 715 (1995) (“The well known Hotelling rule of natural resource extraction (Hotelling 1931)
implies that if the mine owner wishes to maximize the present value of net benefits over the life
of the mine, the royalty schedule must induce the mining firm to exhaust the mine in such a way
that marginal net benefits grow over time at the rate of discount.”).
60. See Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36.
61. Id.
62. Orchard, supra note 36, at 295.
63. Id. at 296.
64. See OTTO ET AL., supra note 47, at 29; Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36 (“The federal
government is receiving substantially higher royalty rates on new leases, but the higher current
rates do not reflect a Marshallian royalty because the stock of western coal is virtually
unlimited.”).
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though economic theory would predict an increasing royalty rate over
time as the resource becomes scarcer.
Nonetheless, the concept of user costs has historically been
relevant as a justification for royalty rates in the United States. U.S.
mining operators and policymakers were aware of the user cost when
determining and evaluating possible royalty rates. Both American
mining operators quoted by Orchard referred to user costs in addition
to economic rents—or, in their words, the part of the royalty “that must
be paid, or else the landowner would not care to let the mine be
worked,” or the part that essentially represented the “capitalization of
assets.”65 And, in congressional hearings on the Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act of 1976, there was concern that “it may not be
desirable to encourage underground mining [via a lower royalty rate]
until technology has evolved which will allow a higher percentage of
recovery.”66 That concern is fundamentally about forgoing future less
costly mine productivity as a result of present mining.
Such a concern, in turn, can be analogized to concern about costly
externalities caused by coal production. The landowner receives a
royalty payment from coal production, but the landowner’s total
benefit is reduced by the environmental damage to his land from the
production. Such a landowner may prefer to wait to extract the coal
until technology evolves that makes coal production less
environmentally costly. When the government owns the land and
minerals, concerns about the net social costs of production become
even more relevant, as discussed in the next Section.
C. Royalties and Externalities
The concepts of economic rent and user cost roughly suggest that
maximum net benefits would accrue to the public when the
government directs royalties at capturing all economic rent and
compensating the public for the user cost. But when resource
extraction produces environmental and other costs to social welfare,
unless corrective measures are taken, the level and rate of exploitation
of the resources will be higher than is socially optimal.67 The concepts
65. Orchard, supra note 36, at 296.
66. Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975: Hearing on S. 391 Before the Subcomm.
On Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the S. Comm. On Interior and Insular Affairs, 94 Cong. 504
app. (1975) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 391]; see also Orchard, supra note 36, at 295–96.
67. See William D. Schulze, Optimal Use of Non-Renewable Resources: The Theory of
Extraction, 1 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 53, 54 (1974) (arguing that considering cumulative
environmental damages, Hotelling’s competitive extraction cannot yield Pareto optimal results);
Timothy R. Muzondo, Mineral Taxation, Market Failure, and the Environment, 40(1) IMF STAFF
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of economic rent and user cost do not directly address what the
government should do in the face of such externalities. Nonetheless,
economics provide a framework for thinking through this complex
issue.
As the White House Council for Economic Advisors recently
explained, ensuring the optimal extraction of mineral resources on
public land is akin to solving a principal-agent problem: the
government (the principal) directs a coal firm (the agent) to efficiently
extract the coal and return economic profits to the government.68 When
the government is the mineral owner, its objective should be to develop
the resource in such a way as to generate maximum net benefits for the
public.69 In the best-case scenario, the government would itself
efficiently extract the coal using the lowest-cost approaches at the
optimal rate, taking into account both direct and external costs of
production, and would keep economic rents and user costs for
taxpayers’ benefit.
In reality, the U.S. government does not extract the resources for
itself and instead relies on coal firms to do so.70 Thus, a royalty payment
would in theory allow the public to enjoy maximum net benefits from
extraction by forcing the coal firms to internalize negative externalities
and align their incentives with those of the government.71 This
justification for a royalty is implicit in Orchard’s characterization of the
minimum royalty as the landowner’s compensation for otherwise
uncompensated environmental externalities of mining such as “the
marring of the beauty of the locality with an ugly mine mouth, a black

PAPERS 152, 160–62 (1993) (arguing that “cumulative environmental externalities will reduce the
rate of growth of marginal profits over time”).
68. CEA COAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 2, 10; see also Gaudet et al., supra note 59, at 716
(characterizing the situation as a principal-agent problem in which the government seeks to
capture all economic rents).
69. See CEA COAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10 (“A common theme among all of these
examples is the goal of maximizing return to the taxpayer from the use of the public resource to
the extent feasible.”); see also GARNAUT & CLUNIES ROSS, supra note 36, at 3–4 (noting that
maximizing government revenue can coincide with maximizing social welfare when, among other
things, “externalities are compensated”); Schantz, supra note 47, at 36 (“When the
government/landowner sells mineral rights, the rent ought to cover expected opportunity and
environmental costs arising from anticipated mining activities.”); Orchard, supra note 36, at 313;
OTTO ET AL., supra note 47, at 29–30.
70. See CEA COAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10 (arguing that the government should align
its incentive with the coal companies to maximize public benefit).
71. See Muzondo, supra note 67, at 162 (“These results [after accounting for negative
externalities in Hotelling’s model] suggest that in mining, where environmental taxes are rarely
imposed, but specific taxes are popular with governments, such taxes can be considered proxies
for current environmental externalities.”); Schantz, supra note 47, at 36.
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coal tipple, or a dump heap.”72 The association of royalty payments
with payments for residual environmental costs is also implicit in the
fact that about half of the federal government’s revenues from royalty
payments are returned to the states where mining occurs.73 The
implications of this revenue-sharing policy are discussed in more detail
in the next Part.
The idea that the royalty can help align producer incentives with
those of the government by addressing externalities is not new. For
example, the existence of positive externalities such as “the stimulation
of an infant industry and the development of mineral resources” was
used as a “principal rationale” for imposing no royalties on the
discovery and extraction of certain minerals in 1872.74 Historically, the
fact that “[o]il and gas operations have minimal effect on surface use
compared to coal operations which are usually highly disruptive to the
surface” has been offered as a justification for different royalty rates
between oil-and-gas extraction and coal production.75 The legislative
history for the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 also
indicates that U.S. policymakers were aware that “[o]ne manner by
which [more costly] underground mining can be encouraged is by the
use of a lower royalty rate on coal mined by underground methods.”76
More recently, Radford Schantz, Jr., a member of a 1993 task force
assembled by Interior for the economic analysis of royalty proposals,
recalled that compensation for environmental impacts was a
justification offered for a royalty at the time.77 In fact, according to him,

72. Orchard, supra note 36, at 295–96. In addition, this justification is implicit in the concern
that “it may not be desirable to encourage underground mining [via a lower royalty rate] until
technology has evolved which will allow a higher percentage of recovery be underground
mining”—that is, a concern that society may benefit more if the resource is left in the ground and
potentially mined at lower social cost in the future. Hearing on S. 391, supra note 66.
73. See, e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON, THE MAKING OF FEDERAL COAL POLICY 1, 225 (Duke
Univ. Press) (1983) (arguing, in 1981, that the royalty rate is excessive partly because states can,
and do, get compensated for the “public costs of coal mining” through direct taxes).
74. SALVATORE LAZZARI, Cong. Research Serv., RL34268, THE FEDERAL ROYALTY AND
TAX TREATMENT OF THE HARDROCK MINERAL INDUSTRY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORTS – TAXATION 20 (2008). Other commentators
have noted that, practically speaking, the government would have been unable to enforce and
collect a royalty in some regions, even if it did set one at that time.
75. Royalty Concepts and Present Applications to Federal Oil and Gas and Coal Leases, 19D
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1986). The fact that offshore oil-and-gas royalty rates are now
significantly higher than minimum onshore coal royalty rates (18.75 percent for offshore drilling
in the Gulf of Mexico versus 12.5 percent for surface-mined coal and 8 percent for underground
coal) further underscores the need to reevaluate coal royalty rates.
76. See Hearing on S. 391, supra note 66.
77. See Schantz, supra note 47, at 36.
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an initial proposal for dealing with pollution from abandoned mines
involved using revenue from royalty payments, “underscoring the
environmental aspect of the royalty.”78 There is also evidence outside
the United States of governments using royalties to motivate changes
in firm behavior. For example, in 1987, New Zealand introduced
royalty payments to help reduce geothermal extraction from the
Rotorua geothermal field.79
Rather than favoring the use of royalties to achieve environmental
goals, however, economists often emphasize that, from the standpoint
of economic efficiency, direct economic instruments (such as a specific
price or quantity condition on pollutants from mining activities) may
be better suited to control environmental externalities.80 This is
because these instruments could be directed at specific environmental
problems and pollutants. Much of this concern is motivated by the idea
that many environmental externalities produce site-specific damages,81
though this concern is notably absent in the context of externalities
from global pollutants like carbon dioxide and methane.
Notwithstanding efficiency concerns, it is undeniable that the financial
and environmental motivations underlying royalty payments “are not
really separate” because, as Schantz explains, “[w]hen correctly
measured, the wealth embodied in in-ground minerals is an indicator
of their social utility value” and “[a]s such, it ought to be net of the
social costs of mining, including the value of environmental impacts.”82
In particular, when there are no direct instruments in use that require
producers to internalize environmental externalities, royalty rates that
account for these externalities can help to avoid undesirably high levels
of production.
In light of these considerations, Schantz models the government’s
supply of a royalty as follows.83 The government landowner weighs the
78. Id.
79. See Bradley J. Scott & Ashley D. Cody, Response of the Rotorua Geothermal System to
Exploitation and Varying Management Regimes, 29 GEOTHERMICS 543, 579 (2000). The royalty
was effective, eventually resulting in signs of recovery for the reservoir. See id.; Brett W.
O’Shaughnessy, Use of Economic Instruments in Management of Rotorua Geothermal Field, New
Zealand, 29 GEOTHERMICS 539, 542 (2000).
80. See, e.g., Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36, at 167 (“Stated differently, assuming impact
costs vary among locations, it is desirable from an efficiency perspective to adopt policies that
discriminate according to site-specific impact costs rather than financing impact through
severance taxes that are imposed at a uniform rate.”); Schantz, supra note 47, at 36.
81. Mutti & Morgan, supra note 36; Schantz, supra note 47, at 36.
82. Schantz, supra note 47, at 36.
83. Id. at 39; see also Orchard, supra note 36, at 295 –96 (suggesting the minimal royalty
compensates the landowner in part for otherwise uncompensated externalities of mining such as
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value of income from the sale against the value of what it gives away.84
The government determines this latter value by evaluating: (1)
opportunity cost, defined as the value of alternative uses of the land;
(2) user cost; and (3) residual environmental impacts not mitigated by
other laws or regulations.85 These considerations form the minimum
royalty that the government would accept at each site (comparable to
Orchard’s statement of the minimum royalty). The demand for leasing
land for exploration and eventual mining, in turn, is determined by the
prospector’s assessment of the expected value of exploration at the site.
Assuming competitive bidding for each site, the optimal royalty that
emerges is equal to the supply price for the site (the opportunity cost,
user cost, and environmental cost) plus, if applicable, a premium for
economic rents at certain sites generated by competition among
prospectors.86 At the marginal site, this premium would be zero, and
the royalty would equal the supply price.87
Economists have modeled the effect of various forms of royalty
and taxes in bringing production closer to the socially optimal level and
rate, but many of the effects are ultimately dependent on the type of
assessment scheme chosen for the royalty.88 In general, however,
royalties take the form of ad valorem taxes, that is, taxes on the amount
or value of the resource.89 Although an analysis of the optimal form of
a royalty is beyond the scope of this article, there is a robust literature
in economics about setting an optimal ad valorem tax in the context of
externalities.90 For example, economist Evan F. Koenig has argued that
ad valorem taxes combined with specific taxes are a viable policy

“the marring of the beauty of the locality with an ugly mine mouth, a black coal tipple, or a dump
heap”).
84. Schantz, supra note 47, at 39.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 40.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Muzondo, supra note 67, at 164–65 (summary table); Ita Falk, Dynamical
Ecologic Taxes: Public Control for Interrelated Renewable Resources, 13 RESOURCE & ENERGY
381 (1991) (evaluating various policies to deal with pollution in the context of Interrelated
renewable resources).
89. See GARNAUT & CLUNIES ROSS, supra note 36, at 92–94.
90. See, e.g., Evan F. Koenig, Indirect Methods for Regulating Externalities under
Uncertainty, 100(2) Q.J. ECON. 479 (1985) (calculating how the ad valorem tax rate can influence
externalities); Jukka Pirttila, Specific Versus Ad Valorem Taxation and Externalities, 76(2) J.
ECON. 177 (2002) (examining “the choice between specific and ad valorem taxes when the
production of a good, produced under imperfect competition, creates harmful externalities”).
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option that may outperform other regulation in appropriately
accounting for externalities given uncertainty under certain
conditions.91
D. MINERAL ROYALTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
Legislative history concerning coal and other mineral resource
extraction in the United States demonstrates that leasing policies and
royalty rates have consistently been used as policy levers to advance
such goals as encouraging development and compensating the public
for the removal and value of mineral resources. Congress has
repeatedly made policy judgments with respect to the value of mineral
resources; the desirability of promoting the development of particular
types of resources; and, beginning in the 20th century, the best way to
allocate revenue from resource extraction to the public and to
communities affected by resource development. In addition, Congress
has vested the Secretary of the Interior with broad authority to set
royalty rates and manage federal fossil fuel leasing programs in order
to best serve the national interest.
A. Early U.S. Mineral Development and the Mineral Leasing Act
One of the earliest records of the United States’ contemplation of
mineral rights appears in the Northwest Territory in the Land
Ordinance of May 20, 1787, which provided that “there shall be
reserved . . . one-third part of all gold, silver, lead, and copper mines,
to be sold, or otherwise disposed of as Congress shall hereafter
direct.”92 But as the settlement of the United States expanded
westward in the 19th century, the general policy of public land
management was to convey land to private ownership in order to
encourage settlement, farming, and mining.93 The gold rush of 1848 led
Congress to consider mineral resource legislation, but it failed to take
meaningful action to control western mineral resources, relying instead
on local laws and customs already in place to manage mining.94
91. Koenig, supra note 90, at 491–92.
92. JOHN C. LACY, HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE MINING LAW: THE MINER’S LAW
BECOMES LAW, IN THE MINING LAW OF 1872: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 13, 16
(1989).
93. Shelby D. Green, Reclaiming the Public Domain by Repeal of the Mining Law of 1872, 6
HOFSTRA PROP. L. J. 85, 152 (1993) (citing LACY, supra note 92, at 16–17); LINDLEY, supra note
25, §§ 54–57, at 81–85 (declaring the policy of the United States to promote westward expansion).
94. Green, supra note 95, at n.21; see also LINDLEY, supra note 25, § 48, at 76–78 (describing
competing concerns in Congress); LINDLEY, supra note 25, § 41, at 63–64 (describing the rise of
gap-filling local customs).
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Starting in the second half of the 19th century, Congress began to
treat coal differently from other minerals, as its value as an energy
source became clear. In 1864 and again in 1873, Congress enacted the
Coal Lands Acts authorizing private purchase in fee simple95 of lands
classified by the Department of the Interior as valuable for coal; those
statutes set a maximum limit of 160 acres on individual entry and
minimum prices of $10 to $20 per acre.96 Congress enacted the General
Mining Law of 1872 to regulate other minerals; that statute authorized
the sale of public lands in fee simple to mining claimants at rates of
$2.50 to $5.00 per acre.97 The Coal Lands Acts and General Mining Act
of 1872 helped develop the West by allowing individuals to obtain
exclusive rights to mine billions of dollars’ worth of gold, silver, coal,
and other hardrock minerals from federal lands without having to pay
a federal royalty.98
At the turn of the 20th century, Congress began to discuss ways to
retain federal control of its mineral resources out of concern for the
price and supply of coal.99 Congress passed the Coal Lands Act of
1909,100 which authorized the issuance of patents to “[a]ny person who
has in good faith located, selected, or entered under the nonmineral
land laws of the United States any lands which subsequently are
classified, claimed, or reported as being valuable for coal,” upon proof
of compliance with land laws.101 The Act, however, mandated that the
patent “shall contain a reservation to the United States of all coal in
said lands, and the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same.”102
Thus, the statute aimed to reconcile the twin goals of the federal
government at that time: to settle the West and to retain federal
ownership of valuable mineral resources.
Legislative history leading up to the passage of the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920 reveals a desire among members of Congress to
95. Fee simple refers to permanent and absolute ownership of property, with freedom to
dispose of it at will.
96. See Act of July 1, 1864, ch. 205, § 1, 13 Stat. 343 (allowing private individuals to bid on
“mines”); Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 279, § 1, 17 Stat. 607.
97. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 26, 29, 30, 37 (2012).
98. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HARDROCK MINING: INFORMATION ON STATE
ROYALTIES AND THE NUMBER OF ABANDONED MINE SITES AND HAZARDS (July 14, 2009),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/123013.pdf.
99. See Hearings on Coal Lands and Coal-Land Laws of the United States Before the House
Comm. on Pub. Lands, *4 59th Cong. 11 –13 (1907) (testimony of Edgar E. Clark, Interstate
Commerce Commissioner).
100. Act of Mar. 3, 1909, ch. 270, 35 Stat. 844 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 81).
101. 30 U.S.C. § 81 (2012).
102. Id.
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retain public ownership of mineral resources.103 Royalty rates were
described as a way to “assure the Government an adequate return from
lessees,”104 and represented the way in which “the community shares in
the element of value.”105 Some representatives from states with federal
land within their borders expressed concern that “the communities in
which these great resources lie would not obtain any considerable part
of the cream of the values taken from them in the way of royalty.”106
This concern has persisted today, in calls for a greater portion of
royalties to be returned to states in which minerals lie and to coastal
states closest to federal offshore mineral tracts. (See discussion later in
this Section.) Other members of Congress were apprehensive about
the broad grant of authority to Interior in the draft bill that would
become the Mineral Leasing Act, stating that “the Secretary of the
Interior is given practically unlimited authority as to the granting and
the terms and conditions of leases.”107
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 provides for the disposition of
reserved minerals, including coal, oil, and natural gas, on federal lands
subject to enumerated lease terms and payments. The Act sets a
minimum royalty rate for “the privileges of mining or extracting the
coal in the lands covered by the lease” payable to the United States of
“not . . . less than 5 cents per ton of two thousand pounds.”108 The
Mineral Leasing Act also states that the Secretary of the Interior can
include coal, oil, or natural gas lease terms that she or he deems
necessary “to insure the sale of the production of such leased lands to
the United States and to the public at reasonable prices, for the
protection of the interests of the United States, for the prevention of
monopoly, and for the safeguarding of the public welfare.”109 Thus,
lease terms were to be adjusted by the Secretary in order to advance
national interests. Royalties during this period were based on cents per
103. Senator Walsh highlighted issues with the prior fee simple system and the goal of
retaining federal control over federal lands, stating, “Some possible criticism might be made, as it
seems to me, of an act which would contemplate the complete alienation of the land, by which
they were to pass entirely out of the ownership and control of the Government of the United
States, that by reason of legislation of that character they might possibly get into the hands of
some great interest—the oil lands, for instance, getting into the hands of Standard Oil Co.” James
D. Harris, The Linowes Commission – Where Are We 25 Years Later?, 1 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 3, 3–7 (2007) (quoting 43 Cong. Rec. 4251 (1919)).
104. 51 Cong. Rec. 14,945 (Sept. 10, 1914) (statement by Mr. Thomson of Illinois).
105. Id. at 14,955.
106. Id. at 14,951.
107. Id. at 14,954.
108. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, Sec. 7.
111. 30 U.S.C. § 187 (2012).
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ton and varied with the quality of coal and associated difficulties of
mining it; this method changed to “a percentage of value royalty”
tailored to mining conditions and coal quality in the late 1960s.110
B. “Fair Market Value” and Royalties as Compensation for
Externalities
By the early 1970s, the environmental movement was gaining
momentum in the United States.111 Policymakers sought to reconcile
competing federal policy aims, such as producing domestic energy
resources and ensuring environmental protection. Legislative history
leading up to the passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act in 1976 shows that Congress sought to use federal royalties as a
policy lever to help effectuate multiple goals for federal mineral
production, including compensating states and the public for mineral
production externalities, providing revenue to the federal government,
and incentivizing certain types of production.
In 1970, the congressionally established bipartisan Public Land
Law Review Commission recommended that all federal lands be
retained in federal ownership unless disposal to private parties would
achieve a greater benefit and provide equitable compensation. In
establishing guidelines for public land management, the Commission
stated, “[t]he end result, of course, is to achieve the maximum benefit
for the general public . . . .”112
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 requires
that the United States “receive fair market value of the use of the
public lands and their resources unless otherwise provided for by
statute.”113 The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976
likewise specifies that no bid may be accepted which is less than “the
fair market value, as determined by the Secretary, of the coal subject
to the lease.”114 The term “fair market value” is not defined in either
110. Federal Coal Leasing: Hearing on S. 3528 Before the Subcomm. On Mines and Mining of
the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93 Cong. 60 (1974), HRG-1974-IIA-0082 (statement
of Jack O. Horton, Assistant Secretary, Land and Water Resources, Department of the Interior)
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 3528].
111. For instance, primary responsibility for environmental protection began to shift from the
states to the federal government with passage of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969
and expansion of the Clean Air Act in 1970, among other federal statutes. See National
Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970); Clean Air Act Extension of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
112. P UBLIC L AND L AW R EVIEW C OMMISSION, O NE T HIRD OF THE NATION’ S L AND : A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT A ND TO THE CONGRESS 1, 38 (1970).
113. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9) (2012).
114. Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083, 1087

Hein Cecot Final (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2017]

2/15/2018 5:35 PM

MINERAL ROYALTIES

23

statute. In 1982—the last time that Interior convened a working group
to comprehensively review its fair market value procedures—the task
force determined that “fair market value” was not merely the value of
the resource discovered or produced, but the value of “the right” to
explore and, if there is a discovery, to develop and produce the energy
resource.115 Indeed, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
refers to the value of using the lands, and not solely to the value of the
resources.
Central to the question of how royalties interact with externalities,
the legislative history of both the Federal Land Policy and
Management and the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976
reflects a concern that states be paid a greater share of federal royalties
to account for social and environmental externalities incurred by
resource production. Congressional testimony leading up to the
passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act in 1976
reveals support for revenue sharing provisions that would direct a
portion of revenue from federal fossil fuel production to the states
where production occurs in order to “help county government[s] cope
with energy development impact problems.”116
In considering a bill leading up to passage of the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, which would direct an additional
12.5 percent of royalty revenues to states with federal leases within
their borders (in addition to the 37.5 percent they already received at
that time), the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs stated,
“[w]hen an area is newly opened to large scale mining, local
governmental entities must assume the responsibility of providing
public services needed for new communities, including schools, roads,
hospitals, sewers, police protection, and other public facilities, as well
as adequate local planning for the development of the community.”117
The legislative history also reflects concern as to “the waste of valuable
resources, and the creation of severe environmental impacts.”118

(1976), codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.
115. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. GAO-14-140, COAL LEASING: BLM COULD
ENHANCE APPRAISAL PROCESS, MORE EXPLICITLY CONSIDER COAL EXPORTS, AND PROVIDE
MORE PUBLIC INFORMATION 3 (Dec. 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659801.pdf.
116. Bills to Provide for the Management, Protection, and Development of the National
Resource Lands, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 1507 and S. 1292 Before the Subcomm. on
Env’t. and Land Res. of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. 1 (1975), HRG1975-IIA-0120 (statement of James Evans, Legislative Rep., National Association of Counties).
117. H.R. Rep. 94-681, 38, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1975 WL 12515 (Leg. Hist.).
118.
Id. at 20.
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The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act increased the state
share of revenue from federal coal royalties, provided that the state
share be used by “giving priority to those subdivisions of the State
socially or economically impacted by development of minerals leased
under this chapter, for (i) planning, (ii) construction and maintenance
of public facilities, and (iii) provision of public service . . . .”119 Thus,
the Act directly links receipt of mineral production revenues to
compensation for the social and environmental costs of mineral
production.
Furthermore,
coastal states
and
their congressional
representatives have repeatedly advocated for a greater share of
offshore oil and natural gas revenue due to significant potential
impacts from these activities on coastal infrastructure and the
environment.120 According to coastal states, these revenues are needed
to mitigate environmental impacts and to maintain the necessary
support structure for the offshore oil and gas industry.121 In addition,
the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 directs coastal states
to use their share of royalty payments from offshore drilling for “the
purposes of coastal protection, including conservation, coastal
restoration, hurricane protection, and infrastructure directly affected
by coastal wetland losses,” and “[m]itigation of damage to fish, wildlife,

119. 30 U.S.C. § 191(a) (2012).
120. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NO. R40645, U. S. OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS
RESOURCES: PROSPECTS AND PROCESSES 19 (April 26, 2010), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/142736.pdf; see also Senate Hearing 113–122, Revenue Sharing Hearing before the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 113th Congress, 1st Session
to Consider S. 1273, The Fair Act of 2013 (July 2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG113shrg85874/html/CHRG-113shrg85874.htm (stating, inter alia, “[r]evenue sharing is vital for
these [coastal] areas to adequately respond to all sorts of impacts associated with enormous
influxes of people and equipment;” “[s]tates and communities will have less incentive to support
this development if they’re expected to shoulder risks and absorb impacts with no opportunity
for revenue sharing;” “there are also cumulative impacts of offshore energy development such as
habitat degradation and coastal erosion that are typically not mitigated at the project level, and it
is important for states to address these impacts. Therefore, a significant portion of a state’s
revenue share should be directed to addressing those unmitigated cumulative impacts, including
through coastal protection and restoration and investments in natural infrastructure such as
forested wetlands, marshes, oyster reefs, barrier islands, and dune systems.”).
121. Id. Of course, to the extent that states receive a greater proportion of the royalty as
compensation for social, environmental, or economic impacts, the federal government will receive
less unless the royalty rate is increased. Rather than reduce the federal government’s share of the
royalty simply because some externalities are borne by the states, Interior could—and should,
from a welfare-maximizing perspective—increase the royalty rate in order to shift more of the
externality costs onto fossil fuel producers and arrive at a more socially optimal royalty rate. See
Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal Energy
Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming, Feb. 2018) (on file with author).
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or natural resources,” among other delineated uses.122 Moreover, the
federal Land and Water Conservation Fund, established in 1965, uses
federal offshore oil and gas revenues to build and maintain public parks
and protect open space across the country.123
Congressional efforts to modernize hardrock mining law also link
royalties to compensation for negative externalities. Pursuant to the
General Mining Law of 1872, one of the last remaining vestiges of the
public land giveaways, companies can mine hardrock minerals on
federal land without paying any royalties.124 The Hardrock Mining and
Reclamation Act of 2007 would have imposed a royalty of 4 percent of
gross revenues on existing mining and 8 percent on new mining
operations.125 Seventy percent of the royalty revenue would have been
directed to a cleanup fund for past abandoned mining operations, and
30 percent to affected communities.126 Similarly, the Hardrock Mining
and Reclamation Act of 2009 would have directed the Secretary of the
Interior to establish a royalty rate of between 8 and 15 percent of the
value of mineral production from new mines on federal lands, with
royalties and reclamation taxes used to reclaim abandoned hardrock
mines.127 Neither bill was passed into law.
Finally, a recent federal regulatory effort aimed at reducing
externalities from oil and natural gas production also recognized that
royalty payments can be employed as policy levers. The Bureau of
Land Management’s 2016 final rule requiring methane emission
reductions for oil and gas producers on federal lands exempts captured
methane, the majority of which comes from natural gas, from royalties
owed to the federal government.128 This royalty-free natural gas can be
analogized to the “fair use” exemption from royalties in another
familiar field, copyright law.129 In both contexts, policymakers
122. See 30 C.F.R § 519.410(a)(2) (2014).
123. See 54 U.S.C. §§ 200302, 200305 (2012).
124. The General Mining Law of 1872, codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22–54 (2012).
125. Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2007, H.R. 2262, 110th Cong. (2007).
126. Id.
127. Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009, H.R. 699, 111th Cong. (2009)
128. See Bureau of Land Management, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties,
and Resource Conservation, 81 Fed. Reg. 83008, 83043 (Nov. 18, 2016) (stating, “this section sets
forth the general rule that royalty is not due on oil or gas that is produced from a lease or
communitized area and used for operations and production purposes (including placing oil or gas
in marketable condition) on the same lease or communitized area without being removed from
the lease or communitized area.”).
129. In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress codified the fair use doctrine, which developed
in the courts as an “equitable rule of reason which permits courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed
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established a royalty-free “fair use” in order to advance the societal
interest by, for example, incentivizing actions with positive
externalities like capturing methane for local reuse at well sites, or
using copyrighted material for educational purposes.130
Interior has also adjusted royalty rates for other purposes,
including incentivizing certain types of resource production and
capturing more value for the federal government. Surface coal
produced has long been subject to a 12.5 percent federal royalty, while
underground coal has been set at 8 percent.131 The main reason
provided in the legislative history for giving Interior discretion to treat
royalty rates for surface mining and underground mining differently
was the perception that underground mining was more difficult and
would produce less valuable coal.132
Finally, Interior raised the offshore oil and gas royalty rate in 2007
in response to a number of factors, including increased oil and gas
prices, technological improvements that made exploration and
production more efficient, and the competitive market for leases.133
Former Interior Secretary Ken Salazar said that increasing the offshore
rate was necessary to ensure that “the American taxpayer is getting a
fair return for the oil and gas that the American people own;” he also
pointed to higher state onshore rates for oil and gas as a possible

to foster.” See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94 553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976); Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). Fair use provides a defense for infringing copyright
uses which are permissible because their overall value to society outweighs the copyright owner’s
interest in enforcing its property boundaries. In other words, Congress made a policy judgment
to set the “royalty rate” at zero for some uses of copyrighted material.
130. See, e.g., Manal Z. Khalil, The Applicability of the Fair Use Defense to Commercial
Advertising: Eliminating Unfounded Limitations, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 661–62 (1992)
(arguing that the fair use doctrine “acknowledges the social desirability of permitting others to
build upon copyrighted works”); Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market
Failures: A Case for A Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L. J.
579, 610–11 (2005) (arguing that “the strongest case for royalty-free fair use is the large number
of positive externalities that are created through the use of creative/copyrightable subject
matter”).
131. 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(a)(2) (2014); see 55 Fed. Reg. 2653-01 (Jan. 26, 1990).
132. See Hearing on S. 3528, supra note 110, at 62 (“You could certainly logically expect to
have much less [sic] amounts bid in a competitive sale for deep coal if you had the same royalty
for surface coal and deep coal.”); see also COMPTROLLER GENERAL, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED
IN ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL COAL-LEASING PROGRAM 1100 (1972) (“[H]e also might
produce much less if he had per ton a higher royalty payment, so he might produce only the richest
coal and not go into the less rich coal because of the higher royalty figure.”).
133. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-14-50, OIL AND GAS
RESOURCES: ACTIONS NEEDED FOR INTERIOR TO BETTER ENSURE A FAIR RETURN 13–14
(Dec. 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659515.pdf.
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justification for raising the onshore federal rate for oil and gas.134
Overall, the legislative history of congressional laws concerning
the extraction of coal and other mineral resources demonstrates that
leasing policies and royalty rates have been used pragmatically,
reflecting policy concerns and concepts of compensation and fairness,
including earning “fair market value.”135 Adjusting state or federal
royalty rates to meet valid policy goals, like reducing environmental
externalities, would be in line with the U.S. government’s long history
of setting the terms and conditions of leasing its land for mineral
extraction to reflect policy priorities.
E. LESSONS FROM PRIVATE ROYALTIES
So far, common law history, economic theory, and U.S. legislative
history have underscored the appropriateness of federal and state
governments acting as landowners and, in the interests of their
respective citizens, adjusting mineral royalty rates to enhance public
welfare. In this endeavor, private royalty rates and mineral resource
leases might appear to be less relevant. In reality, however, these
private decisions are influenced by similar factors, including expected
economic rent, characteristics of the resource, competition for leases,
and externalities that may affect the leaseholder, such as noise and
pollution.136 Examining the factors that private parties consider when
attempting to maximize their self-interest further underscores the
validity of similar factors that the government may consider in setting
royalties to advance societal goals.
Outside of any required state minimum, the exact value of a
royalty rate can be negotiated between the mineral owner and the
production company. The rates therefore vary and often depend on the

134. Hon. Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, Interior, Environment, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 2013, Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies (Feb. 16, 2012), pp. 46–47,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg74739/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg74739.pdf
(“The
underlying principle is we are mandated by statute, mandated by fairness to make sure the
American taxpayer is getting a fair return for the assets the American people own.”).
135. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9) (2012) (stating
that it is policy that “the United States receive fair market value of the use of public lands and
their resources unless otherwise provided for by statute”).
136. See COLORADO OIL & GAS ASSOC., THE BASICS: MINERAL RIGHTS, ROYALTIES &
SURFACE USE AGREEMENTS (2013), http://www.coga.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09
/3Basics_MineralRights.pdf; Christopher Timmins & Ashley Vissing, Shale Gas Leases: Is
Bargaining Efficient and What Are the Implications for Homeowners if it is Not? (Dept. of Econ.,
Duke
Univ.,
Working
Paper,
2014),
http://public.econ.duke.edu/~timmins/
Timmins_Vissing_11_15.pdf.
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negotiation power and skills of each party. Negotiation power, in turn,
depends on how many acres of resource the mineral owner owns, how
close the land is to “proven production,” and how many other
companies are competing for the specific lease.137 As expected, the
owner of “a large tract next to a newly discovered field with numerous
oil companies vying for the lease” would possess a significant amount
of negotiation power138 and could negotiate a high royalty rate for the
lease. Economists Christopher Timmins and Ashley Vissing have
found that demographic factors are also associated with negotiation
power, with high-income mineral owners able to negotiate higher
royalty rates.139
In negotiating the substance of these private leases, the parties
often take into account pollution, surface disruptions, and other
externalities. For example, mineral owners, in addition to negotiating
the royalty rate, can negotiate lease terms such as environmental
clauses that encourage the use of safeguards to prevent contamination
of soil and water, and noise clauses that require the use of mufflers with
loud equipment.140 And in cases when mineral rights and surface rights
are held separately (commonly referred to as a split-estate), the surface
owner can negotiate compensation for protection from “unreasonable
encroachment and damage” to the surface.141 One 1979 commentator
urged that “[l]andowner-lessors should provide for escalating royalty
payments according to the type of mining method used” to account for
differences in waste production.142
F. CONCLUSION
Royalties have several commonly accepted justifications,
including sharing in economic rent, compensating the owner for
removal of a nonrenewable resource, and compensating the owner for
negative externalities associated with production of the resource.
While the externality justification appears much more frequently in
137. Judon Fambrough, REAL ESTATE CENTER, TEX. A&M UNIV., HINTS ON NEGOTIATING
OIL & GAS LEASE 3 (2015) [hereinafter Hints], https://assets.recenter.tamu.edu/
documents/articles/229.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Timmins & Vissing, supra note 138.
140. Id. at 72.
141. ANTHONY ANDREWS, UNCONVENTIONAL GAS SHALES: DEVELOPMENT,
TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY ISSUES 27 (2010).
142. Laurence W. Hancock, Note, Preventive Law and the Negotiating and Drafting of Coal
Leases after the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 733, 746–
47 (1979).
AN
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recent economic literature and legislative history, royalties have been
used as a policy lever to promote social welfare for centuries. Historical
uses, accepted economic justifications, legislative history, and
examples of royalty use by private actors all support the determination
that it would be appropriate for federal and state governments to
increase fossil fuel royalty rates to account for externality costs.
Indeed, doing so would be an expedient and potentially lucrative way
to align natural resources leasing with greenhouse gas reduction goals,
even as other mechanisms to address climate change appear infeasible
in the current political environment.

